Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1145526
 
 

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Effectiveness of Government Interventions at Inducing Better Environmental Performance: Does Effectiveness Depend on Facility or Firm Features?


Robert L. Glicksman


George Washington University - Law School

Dietrich Earnhart


University of Kansas - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, Vol. 35, 2008

Abstract:     
Environmental agencies have several options for dealing with alleged noncompliance with environmental regulations. These options include pursuit of administrative or judicial civil penalties and injunctions to prevent future violations. Scholars have begun exploring whether these options induce better performance by regulated entities. This Article addresses a largely neglected question: whether a regulated facility's characteristics affect the efficacy of the different enforcement options. The Article stems from a study of compliance by the chemical industry with federal Clean Water Act permits. It assesses whether facility characteristics, including effluent limit level and type, permit modifications, facility size, capacity utilization, discharge volatility, and ownership structure, theoretically should make a difference and actually appeared to do so at the facilities covered by the study. The findings should be of interest to both facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act and federal and state regulators seeking to maximize the impact of their enforcement actions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Environmental law, enforcement, Clean Water Act, empirical analysis, role of facility characteristics

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Date posted: June 15, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Glicksman, Robert L. and Earnhart, Dietrich, Effectiveness of Government Interventions at Inducing Better Environmental Performance: Does Effectiveness Depend on Facility or Firm Features?. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, Vol. 35, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1145526

Contact Information

Robert L. Glicksman (Contact Author)
George Washington University - Law School ( email )
2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-4641 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=16085
Dietrich Earnhart
University of Kansas - Department of Economics ( email )
Lawrence, KS 66049
United States
785-864-2866 (Phone)
785-864-5270 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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