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Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing

Alden F. Abbott
affiliation not provided to SSRN

Joshua D. Wright
George Mason University School of Law

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming

Abstract:
This chapter surveys the legal and economic literatures on the antitrust analysis of tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts. We review the analytical framework applied under U.S. antitrust law to tying, bundling and exclusive dealing arrangements as well as the existing theoretical and empirical literatures.

Keywords: antitrust, bundling, competitive harm, empirical evidence, exclusionary conduct, exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, market power, monopolization, procompetitive efficiencies, tying

JEL Classifications: K21, L12, L14, L41, L42

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: June 16, 2008 ; Last revised: June 16, 2008

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Alden F. and Wright, Joshua D., Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing. George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37; ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1145529

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Contact Information

Joshua D. Wright (Contact Author) George Mason University School of Law ( email ) 3301 Fairfax Drive Arlington, VA 22201 United States
Alden F. Abbott affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )