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Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive DealingAlden F. AbbottGovernment of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission Joshua D. WrightGeorge Mason University School of Law George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37 ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming Abstract: This chapter surveys the legal and economic literatures on the antitrust analysis of tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts. We review the analytical framework applied under U.S. antitrust law to tying, bundling and exclusive dealing arrangements as well as the existing theoretical and empirical literatures.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34 Keywords: antitrust, bundling, competitive harm, empirical evidence, exclusionary conduct, exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, market power, monopolization, procompetitive efficiencies, tying JEL Classification: K21, L12, L14, L41, L42 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: June 16, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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