Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing
Alden F. Abbott
Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission
Joshua D. Wright
Federal Trade Commission; George Mason University School of Law
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming
This chapter surveys the legal and economic literatures on the antitrust analysis of tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts. We review the analytical framework applied under U.S. antitrust law to tying, bundling and exclusive dealing arrangements as well as the existing theoretical and empirical literatures.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: antitrust, bundling, competitive harm, empirical evidence, exclusionary conduct, exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, market power, monopolization, procompetitive efficiencies, tying
JEL Classification: K21, L12, L14, L41, L42Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 16, 2008
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