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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1146451
 
 

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Competition Policy and the Incentive to Innovate: The Dynamic Effects of Microsoft v. Commission


Daniel F. Spulber


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management


Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-18

Abstract:     
Microsoft v. Commission indicates a shift in competition policy at the expense of protections for intellectual property. The case applies "essential facilities" arguments to Microsoft's server operating system and "tying" arguments to its Windows Media Player. The dynamic effects of Microsoft v. Commission pose a substantial risk to the incentive to innovate in several ways. First, mandatory licensing and unbundling of the elements of an invention erode intellectual property rights. Second, the targeting of multinational corporations by the European Union creates barriers to international trade whose impacts extend across the global economy. Third, the interpretation of "abuse of a dominant position" focuses on market outcomes rather than on anticompetitive conduct, thus penalizing successful innovators and rewarding their competitors. Competition policy based on Microsoft v. Commission diminishes the incentive to innovate.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: Competition Policy, Antitrust, Microsoft v. Commission, Innovation, Intellectual property, International trade, Essential facilities, Multinational corporation, Windows, European Union

JEL Classification: L1, L4, K21, O3

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Date posted: June 16, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Spulber, Daniel F., Competition Policy and the Incentive to Innovate: The Dynamic Effects of Microsoft v. Commission. Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1146451 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1146451

Contact Information

Daniel F. Spulber (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
606 Leverone Hall
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-8675 (Phone)
847-467-1777 (Fax)
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