Public Choice and the International Harmonization of Antitrust Law
Spencer Weber Waller
Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law - Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies
Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 48, No. p. 427, 2003
This essay comments on three different articles offered by Diane Wood, Eleanor Fox and Peter Kunzlik at a symposium at the University of Minnesota in honor of the work of E. Thomas Sullivan. Each of the three articles provides different perspectives on the desirability and likelihood of the international harmonization of antitrust law. My comment uses public choice to tie together these three seemingly diverse approaches and to apply public choice theory to examine how, where, and why harmonization of competition law and policy has succeeded or failed.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 8
Keywords: antitrust, competition law, harmonization, WTO, International Competition Network, OECD, soft harmonization, European Union, public choice, jurisdiction, cartels, leniency, amnesty
JEL Classification: K21, K33, K42, L10, L11, L12, L40, L41, L42, F10Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 16, 2008
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