Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1146648
 
 

References (25)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry


Henry S. Schneider


Cornell University - S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management

November 1, 2008

Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 03-09

Abstract:     
In this study, I investigate the effects of moral hazard in leasing contracts by examining the driving outcomes of all long-term lessees and owner-operators of New York City taxis. I find that moral hazard explains a sizable fraction of lessees' accidents, driving violations, and vehicle inspection failures, and erodes a moderate fraction of industry income. To address the possibility of endogenous contract choice, I conduct an instrumental variables analysis on the cross-section of all drivers, and a panel-data analysis on a subset of drivers who switched from leasing to owning.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: June 16, 2008 ; Last revised: February 20, 2010

Suggested Citation

Schneider, Henry S., Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry (November 1, 2008). Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 03-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1146648

Contact Information

Henry S. Schneider (Contact Author)
Cornell University - S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,253
Downloads: 309
Download Rank: 56,095
References:  25
Citations:  4

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.406 seconds