Abstract

 


 



Protecting the Vulnerable: The Tradeoff between Risk Reduction and Public Insurance


Shantayanan Devarajan


World Bank Africa Region

2007

The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 73-91, 2007

Abstract:     
In a risky world should governments provide public goods that reduce risk or compensate the victims of bad outcomes through social insurance? This article examines a basic question in designing social protection policies: how should a government allocate a fixed budget between these two activities? In the presence of income and risk heterogeneities a simple public insurance scheme that pays a fixed benefit to all households that suffer a negative shock is an effective redistributional instrument of public policy. This is true even when a well functioning private insurance market exists, and so the role of public insurance is not to correct a market failure. In fact, the existence of a private insurance market means that the public system has desirable targeting properties-all but the poor and high-risk take up private insurance. The provision of public goods that reduce risk for all should therefore be complemented with public insurance that (automatically) benefits those who are especially vulnerable.

Keywords: H41, H42, I38

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: June 18, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Devarajan, Shantayanan , Protecting the Vulnerable: The Tradeoff between Risk Reduction and Public Insurance (2007). The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, pp. 73-91, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1147462 or http://dx.doi.org/lhl007

Contact Information

Shantayanan Devarajan (Contact Author)
World Bank Africa Region ( email )
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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