Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
October 20, 2008
NET Institute Working Paper No. 08-09
This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome may prevail independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A lighthanded regulatory policy can induce effective competition. Call prices are close to the marginal cost if the networks are sufficiently close substitutes. Neither demand nor cost information is required. A unique and symmetric call price equilibrium exists under symmetric access prices, provided that call demand is sufficiently inelastic. Existence encompasses the case of many networks and high network substitutability.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: network competition, two-way access, mobile termination
JEL Classification: L12, L14, L51, L96
Date posted: June 18, 2008 ; Last revised: December 25, 2013
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.454 seconds