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Thomas Ruffin: Of Moral Philosophy and Monuments

Alfred L. Brophy

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law

"Thomas Ruffin: Of Moral Philosophy and Monuments" returns to Justice Thomas Ruffin's opinions, particularly on slavery, to excavate his jurisprudence and to try to assess what Ruffin's legacy means for us today. It begins with an exploration of Ruffin's 1830 opinion in State v. Mann, where he self-consciously separated his feelings from his legal opinion to release a man who abused a slave from criminal liability. Anti-slavery activists frequently wrote about Mann, because of its brutal honesty about the harsh nature of slavery. After discussing Harriet Beecher Stowe's fictional account of Ruffin and Mann in Dred: "A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp", which further developed the theme of separation of law and morals, the paper turns to some of Ruffin's other opinions. It looks to slavery opinions including Heathcock v. Pennington (which released a renter of a slave from liability for the boy's death in a coal mine) and Green v. Lane (which dealt with a trust to give quasi-freedom to slaves), as well as non-slavery cases like Scroggins v. Scroggins (which argued against granting judicial divorces because that would encourage more of them).

Ruffin's jurisprudence took the world as it was, or as he phrased it, looked to the nature of things. His judicial opinions - the monuments he left to us - illustrate a world of proslavery moral philosophy. That thought separated humanity from law and then decided cases based on precedent and considerations of utility to society. Ruffin was a great expositor of the system of slavery, as well as a great wielder of what Stowe called cold legal logic.

What should we make of this legacy today? Perhaps Ruffin aided the cause of antislavery through his honesty in State v. Mann. And, thus, perhaps we should honor him for that. Moreover, perhaps the honor he received in the early twentieth century (when a dormitory was named in part for him on the UNC campus) derives from his facility with legal reasoning outside of the slavery context. However, honoring him also runs the risk of honoring proslavery values. Conversely, removing his name from a building now runs the risk of concealing the prevalence of proslavery thought in the nineteenth century. That is, removing a name might facilitate a process of forgetting when universities should be trying to provide a proper context for viewing our past.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: monuments, moral philosophy, jurisprudence, slavery, legal history

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Date posted: June 25, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Brophy, Alfred L., Thomas Ruffin: Of Moral Philosophy and Monuments. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1147869 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1147869

Contact Information

Alfred L. Brophy (Contact Author)
University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law ( email )
Van Hecke-Wettach Hall, 160 Ridge Road
CB #3380
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3380
United States
919-962-4128 (Phone)

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