Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1148991
 
 

References (15)



 
 

Citations (27)



 


 



Executive Pay and 'Independent' Compensation Consultants


Kevin J. Murphy


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business; University of Southern California - Department of Economics; USC Gould School of Law

Tatiana Sandino


Harvard Business School - Accounting and Control

November 22, 2009

Marshall School of Business Working Paper No. FBE 10-09
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Executive compensation consultants face potential conflicts of interest that can lead to higher recommended levels of CEO pay, including the desires to “cross-sell” services and to secure “repeat business.” We find evidence in both the US and Canada that CEO pay is higher in companies where the consultant provides other services, and that pay is higher in Canadian firms when the fees paid to consultants for other services are large relative to the fees for executive-compensation services. Contrary to expectations, we find that pay is higher in US firms where the consultant works for the board rather than for management.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Compensation Consultants, Conflicts of Interest, CEO Pay, board of directors, director pay, corporate governance, disclosure

JEL Classification: J33, M52, M48, G38

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Date posted: June 21, 2008 ; Last revised: February 24, 2010

Suggested Citation

Murphy, Kevin J. and Sandino, Tatiana, Executive Pay and 'Independent' Compensation Consultants (November 22, 2009). Marshall School of Business Working Paper No. FBE 10-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1148991

Contact Information

Kevin J. Murphy (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
BRI 308, MC 0804
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804
United States
213-740-6553 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

University of Southern California - Department of Economics
3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
USC Gould School of Law
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Tatiana Sandino
Harvard Business School - Accounting and Control ( email )
367 Morgan Hall
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-0625 (Phone)
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