Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Settlements

31 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Desiree Nilsson

Desiree Nilsson

World Bank; Uppsala University - Department of Peace and Conflict Research

Date Written: March 1, 2008

Abstract

Previous research proposes that peace is more likely to become durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement reached. The argument implies that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed an agreement. This article argues that all-inclusive peace deals - signed by the government and all rebel groups - are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. Given that the parties are strategic actors who are forward-looking when making their decisions, the signatories should anticipate that the excluded parties may continue to fight. Therefore, the risk of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to already be factored into the decision-making calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal, and so does not affect their commitment to peace. Implications from this theoretical argument are tested using unique data on the conflict behavior of the government and each of the rebel groups in internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War period. The results are well in line with the theoretical expectations and show that whether an agreementleaves out some actor does not affect whether the signatories stick to peace. The results demonstrate that even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, this does not affect the signatories'commitment to peace. Hence, the findings suggest that partial peace is possible.

Keywords: Post Conflict Reconstruction, Post Conflict Reintegration, Peace & Peacekeeping, International Affairs, Social Conflict and Violence

Suggested Citation

Nilsson, Desiree, Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Settlements (March 1, 2008). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4572, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1149075

Desiree Nilsson (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Uppsala University - Department of Peace and Conflict Research ( email )

Box 513
Uppsala, 751 20
Sweden