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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1149361
 
 

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Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities


Claudia M. Landeo


University of Alberta - Department of Economics

Kathryn E. Spier


Harvard University - Law School - Faculty; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

June 2008

NBER Working Paper No. w14115

Abstract:     
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

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Date posted: June 22, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Landeo, Claudia M. and Spier, Kathryn E., Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities (June 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w14115. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1149361

Contact Information

Claudia M. Landeo
University of Alberta - Department of Economics ( email )
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~econweb/landeo/
Kathryn E. Spier (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Law School - Faculty ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 302
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 496-0019 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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