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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150963
 
 

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Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures


Daniel Diermeier


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Razvan Vlaicu


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

December 1, 2010


Abstract:     
We present a model of parties-in-legislatures that can support partisan policy outcomes despite the absence of any party-imposed voting discipline. Legislators choose all procedures and policies through majority-rule bargaining and cannot commit to vote against their preferences on either. Yet, off-median policy bias occurs in equilibrium because a majority of legislators with correlated preferences has policy-driven incentives to adopt partisan agenda-setting rules - as a consequence, bills reach the floor disproportionately from one side of the ideological spectrum. The model recovers as special cases the claims of both partisan and non-partisan theories in the ongoing debate over the nature of party influence in the U.S. Congress. We show that: (1) party influence increases in polarization, and (2) the legislative median controls policymaking only when there are no bargaining frictions and no polarization. We discuss the implications of our findings for the theoretical and empirical study of legislatures.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: party influence, legislative organization, endogenous agenda-setting rules, coalitions, U.S. Congress

JEL Classification: D72, D78, C72

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Date posted: June 24, 2008 ; Last revised: January 26, 2011

Suggested Citation

Diermeier, Daniel and Vlaicu, Razvan, Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures (December 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150963 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1150963

Contact Information

Daniel Diermeier
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
Razvan Vlaicu (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Rd, MEDS 5th Floor
Evanston, IL 60208-2001
United States
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