Optional Federal Chartering of Insurance: Rationale and Design of a Regulatory Structure
Martin F. Grace
Georgia State University - Robinson College of Business; Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Hal S. Scott
Harvard Law School
June 26, 2008
The U.S. insurance industry is primarily regulated by the states. This is in contrast to the regulatory structure for other financial intermediaries which have a federal regulator. Banks, for example, may choose to be regulated by either the federal government or by the states. Recent legislation proposes to provide a similar optional federal chartering (OFC) system for insurers. Given the proposed legislation we make two contributions to the discussion. First, we examine the case for optional federal charters focusing on the costs and benefits of regulation at the federal versus the state level and conclude that and optional federal chartering system dominates the status quo. Second, we add to the discussion by describing what additional issues need to be addressed if we adopt an insurance OFC system. While the merits of OFC have been much debated, comparatively little consideration has been given to the matter of how such a system should function if enacted.
Keywords: insurance regulation, federalism, optional federal charterworking papers series
Date posted: July 17, 2008 ; Last revised: October 23, 2008
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.297 seconds