Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152693
 
 

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Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice


M. Kate Bundorf


Stanford University - Department of Health Research And Policy; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jonathan Levin


Stanford University - Department of Economics; Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Neale Mahoney


University of Chicago Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

June 2008

NBER Working Paper No. w14153

Abstract:     
Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers' expected costs of coverage for different enrollees. This can create inefficient distortions when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple model to study this problem and estimate it using new data on small employers. In the markets we observe, the welfare loss compared to the feasible efficient benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs. Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices. Despite the inefficiency, we find substantial benefits from plan choice relative to single-insurer options.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

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Date posted: June 30, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Bundorf, M. Kate and Levin, Jonathan and Mahoney, Neale, Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice (June 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w14153. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152693

Contact Information

M. Kate Bundorf (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Health Research And Policy ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Jonathan D. Levin
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Neale Mahoney
University of Chicago Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 South Woodlawn Ave
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773.702.9278 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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