Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1155023
 
 

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Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting


Timothy A.O. Endicott


University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

July 3, 2008

Legal Theory, Vol. 4, pp. 283-300, 1998, reprinted in HART'S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTCRIPT TO 'THE CONCEPT OF LAW', Jules Coleman, ed, Oxford University Press, 2001

Abstract:     
Ronald Dworkin has argued that H.L.A.Hart's theory of law is based on a 'criterial' semantic theory, which disfigures his theory of law because it can give no adequate account of 'theoretical' disagreement as to the content of the law. I conclude that a sound theory will reject criterial semantics. But Hart did not have a criterial semantic theory. His theory can make sense of genuine theoretical disagreement. To Hart, theoretical disagreement is explicable as deep disagreement as to the use of paradigms. I also conclude that a sound theory cannot accept two distinctive claims of Law's Empire: that no paradigm of an abstract concept is secure from the interpretive process, and that abstract words are not vague.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: jurisprudence, Hart

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Date posted: July 4, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Endicott, Timothy A.O., Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting (July 3, 2008). Legal Theory, Vol. 4, pp. 283-300, 1998, reprinted in HART'S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTCRIPT TO 'THE CONCEPT OF LAW', Jules Coleman, ed, Oxford University Press, 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1155023

Contact Information

Timothy A.O. Endicott (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
St. Cross Building
St. Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UJ
United Kingdom
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