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The Economics of Organizing Economists
Luke Froeb Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management Paul A. Pautler U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics Lars-Hendrik Röller ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) - Competitiveness and Industrial Change July 3, 2008 Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-18 Abstract: The organizational form of a competition agency affects its decision making. Functional organizations produce higher quality analysis but integrating the analysis into the decision-making process is more difficult than with a divisional form, organized around a specific sector or industry. This paper analyzes the tradeoff, with a particular focus on the role of economists in competition agencies around the world. We conclude that an effective functional organization requires strong horizontal links across the legal and economic bureaus and that an effective divisional organization requires separate economic and attorney recommendations, as well as managers who possess functional expertise in both economics and the law.
Keywords: Antitrust Enforcement, Antitrust Division, FTC, European Commission, Economists, Functional Organization, Divisional Organization JEL Classifications: L4, L2, M5 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: July 06, 2008 ; Last revised: February 12, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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