The Economics of Organizing Economists
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics
Paul A. Pautler
U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics
ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); WZB Berlin Social Science Center - Competitiveness and Industrial Change
July 3, 2008
Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-18
The organizational form of a competition agency affects its decision making. Functional organizations produce higher quality analysis but integrating the analysis into the decision-making process is more difficult than with a divisional form, organized around a specific sector or industry. This paper analyzes the tradeoff, with a particular focus on the role of economists in competition agencies around the world. We conclude that an effective functional organization requires strong horizontal links across the legal and economic bureaus and that an effective divisional organization requires separate economic and attorney recommendations, as well as managers who possess functional expertise in both economics and the law.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24
Keywords: Antitrust Enforcement, Antitrust Division, FTC, European Commission, Economists, Functional Organization, Divisional Organization
JEL Classification: L4, L2, M5working papers series
Date posted: July 6, 2008 ; Last revised: November 20, 2012
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