Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1155237
 
 

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The Economics of Organizing Economists


Luke Froeb


Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

Paul A. Pautler


U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics

Lars-Hendrik Röller


ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) - Competitiveness and Industrial Change

July 3, 2008

Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-18

Abstract:     
The organizational form of a competition agency affects its decision making. Functional organizations produce higher quality analysis but integrating the analysis into the decision-making process is more difficult than with a divisional form, organized around a specific sector or industry. This paper analyzes the tradeoff, with a particular focus on the role of economists in competition agencies around the world. We conclude that an effective functional organization requires strong horizontal links across the legal and economic bureaus and that an effective divisional organization requires separate economic and attorney recommendations, as well as managers who possess functional expertise in both economics and the law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Antitrust Enforcement, Antitrust Division, FTC, European Commission, Economists, Functional Organization, Divisional Organization

JEL Classification: L4, L2, M5

working papers series


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Date posted: July 6, 2008 ; Last revised: November 20, 2012

Suggested Citation

Froeb, Luke and Pautler, Paul A. and Röller, Lars-Hendrik, The Economics of Organizing Economists (July 3, 2008). Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1155237 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1155237

Contact Information

Luke M. Froeb (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-9057 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)

Paul A. Pautler
U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics ( email )
601 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States
Lars-Hendrik Röller
ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )
Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/eng/faculty-research/lars-hendrik-roeller/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) - Competitiveness and Industrial Change ( email )
Reichpietschufer 50
10785 Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2549 1440 (Phone)
+49 30 2549 1442 (Fax)
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