A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Jack I. Garvey
University of San Francisco - School of Law
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 12, Issue 3, pp. 339-357, 2007
The new architecture for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons proposed here is a mandatory regime under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, building upon the current consensual regime, but remedying its deficiencies. This article examines the operation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in relation to current nuclear policy dynamics, explaining why the treaty regime has become increasingly inadequate to meet the proliferation challenge, and even counter-productive. The recent confrontations over nuclear policy with Iran, Saddam Hussein's Iraq and North Korea are drawn upon as illustrations and support for the new architecture's foundation - a Security Council Resolution declaring nuclear weapons proliferation, whether generated by states or non-state actors, a threat to the peace. The new architecture, while integrating key elements of the present non-proliferation framework, would be prescriptive, not merely reactive and ad hoc, the difference arising from its basis in a statement of principle under Chapter VII of the Charter. The article explains how this would engage a design similar to post 9/11 anti-terrorism innovation in the Security Council to achieve a more promising dimension of deterrence, political legitimacy and effectiveness in negotiation of non-proliferation. The new architecture includes the so-called targeted sanctions , a new tool already proven meritorious for anti-terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts. In conclusion, the article evaluates evidence demonstrating that the necessary political will is available to achieve the proposed new architecture and frames the essential policy choice.
Date posted: July 7, 2008
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 2.468 seconds