Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156164
 
 

References (21)



 


 



Industry Restructuring: A Case for Affirmative Action


Bertrand Villeneuve


Université Paris-Dauphine; National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST)

Vanessa Yanhua Zhang


Global Economics Group, LLC; Renmin University of China

May 30, 2012

Forthcoming at Annales d'Economie et Statistique

Abstract:     
We analyze the trade-off faced by authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is modeled as (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of scarce sites or any other non-reproducible assets. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which firms durably differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here is the policy that recognizes the fact that, under certain circumstances, helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: Competition policy, capacity accumulation, Cournot competition, asymmetric duopoly, regulatory consistency, differential games

JEL Classification: C73, L13, L40

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Date posted: July 24, 2008 ; Last revised: October 24, 2012

Suggested Citation

Villeneuve, Bertrand and Zhang, Vanessa Yanhua, Industry Restructuring: A Case for Affirmative Action (May 30, 2012). Forthcoming at Annales d'Economie et Statistique . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156164 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1156164

Contact Information

Bertrand Villeneuve (Contact Author)
Université Paris-Dauphine ( email )
223 Rue Saint-Honore
Paris, 75775
France
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST) ( email )
15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
92245 Malakoff Cedex, 1 92245
France
Vanessa Yanhua Zhang
Global Economics Group, LLC ( email )
1400 S. Dearborn, Suite 400
Chicago, IL 60603
United States
Renmin University of China ( email )
Room B906
Xianjin Building
Beijing, Beijing 100872
China
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