Disclosure Quality, Cost of Capital, and Investors' Welfare
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
May 25, 2009
Chicago GSB Research Paper No. 08-06
Accounting Review, Forthcoming
One might expect that disclosure quality improves investor welfare by reducing cost of capital. This study shows that the argument is valid only in limited circumstances. Based on a production economy with perfect competition among investors, the analysis demonstrates three points. First, cost of capital could increase with disclosure quality when new investment is sufficiently elastic. Second, there are plausible conditions under which disclosure quality reduces the welfare of current and/or new investors. Finally, cost of capital could move in opposition to the welfare of either current or new investors as disclosure quality changes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: Cost of Capital, Disclosure, Welfare, Real Effect
JEL Classification: G12, G34, G38, M41, M45
Date posted: July 7, 2008 ; Last revised: September 10, 2009
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