Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress
D. Roderick Kiewiet
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University School of Law
In this essay we model appropriations decisions as products of a bilateral bargaining game between reelection-minded president and Congress. The findings bear out the expectaion that the two sides jointly puruse a strategy of accomodation. In awarding appropriations, Congress takes into account the president's preferences embodied in the OMB's budget requests; these requests in turn reflected expectations of congressional action. The evidence also reveals that several important exogenous political and economic variables influence bith executive and legislative appropriations decisions.
Date posted: July 7, 2008
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