Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress
D. Roderick Kiewiet
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Mathew D. McCubbins
In this essay we model appropriations decisions as products of a bilateral bargaining game between reelection-minded president and Congress. The findings bear out the expectaion that the two sides jointly puruse a strategy of accomodation. In awarding appropriations, Congress takes into account the president's preferences embodied in the OMB's budget requests; these requests in turn reflected expectations of congressional action. The evidence also reveals that several important exogenous political and economic variables influence bith executive and legislative appropriations decisions.
working papers series
Date posted: July 7, 2008
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