Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156468
 
 

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Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress


D. Roderick Kiewiet


California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Mathew D. McCubbins


Duke University

May 1985


Abstract:     
In this essay we model appropriations decisions as products of a bilateral bargaining game between reelection-minded president and Congress. The findings bear out the expectaion that the two sides jointly puruse a strategy of accomodation. In awarding appropriations, Congress takes into account the president's preferences embodied in the OMB's budget requests; these requests in turn reflected expectations of congressional action. The evidence also reveals that several important exogenous political and economic variables influence bith executive and legislative appropriations decisions.

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Date posted: July 7, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and McCubbins, Mathew D., Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress (May 1985). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156468

Contact Information

D. Roderick Kiewiet (Contact Author)
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626 395-4032 (Phone)
Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University ( email )
Department of Political Science
208 Gross Hall, 140 Science Drive
Durham, NC 27708
United States
(213) 973-7538 (Phone)
(213) 973-3623 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mccubbins.us
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