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Are Merger Regulations Diluting Parliamentary Intent?


Manish Agarwal


University of South Australia

Aditya Bhattacharjea


Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi


Economic and Politcal Weekly, Vol. 43, Nos. 26-27, pp. 10-13, June 28, 2008

Abstract:     
India's Competition Act (2002) was amended in 2007, modifying inter alia the Act's thresholds for merger review, and requiring mandatory rather than voluntary notification of mergers above the revised thresholds. This created considerable opposition in international business and legal circles. Draft merger regulations proposed by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) in early 2008 have responded by categorizing mergers which do not fulfill a two-firm local nexus requirement as those unlikely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India. We critically evaluate this claim and argue on the basis of international and Indian experience that the regulations will result in the CCI turning a blind eye to cross-border mergers designed to pre-empt potential competition or competition from small "maverick" firms. The regulations dilute parliamentary intent in requiring mandatory notification.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 7

Keywords: Merger review, antitrust, India, competition law, multinationals

JEL Classification: K21, L40

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Date posted: July 10, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Agarwal, Manish and Bhattacharjea, Aditya, Are Merger Regulations Diluting Parliamentary Intent?. Economic and Politcal Weekly, Vol. 43, Nos. 26-27, pp. 10-13, June 28, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1157674

Contact Information

Manish Agarwal (Contact Author)
University of South Australia ( email )
Adelaide South Australia, 5000
Australia
Aditya Bhattacharjea
Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi ( email )
University Enclave
Delhi, 110007
India
(91-11)2766-6533 (Phone)
(91-11)2766-7159 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econdse.org/faculty/aditya/aditya.htm
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