Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158060
 
 

References (48)



 
 

Citations (65)



 


 



The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance


Scott Dyreng


Duke University

Michelle Hanlon


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Edward L. Maydew


University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

September 9, 2009


Abstract:     
This paper investigates whether individual top executives have incremental effects on their firms’ tax avoidance that cannot be explained by characteristics of the firm. To identify executive effects on firms’ effective tax rates, we construct a dataset that tracks the movement of 908 executives across firms over time. The results indicate that individual executives play a significant role in determining the level of tax avoidance that firms undertake. The economic magnitude of the executive effects on tax avoidance is large. Moving between the top and bottom quartiles of executives results in approximately an eleven percent swing in GAAP effective tax rates; thus, executive effects appear to be an important determinant in firms’ tax avoidance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Tax avoidance, tax, manager effects, tax aggressive, effective tax rate, cash tax rate

JEL Classification: H25, M41, M43, G30

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: July 11, 2008 ; Last revised: September 19, 2012

Suggested Citation

Dyreng, Scott and Hanlon, Michelle and Maydew, Edward L., The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance (September 9, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158060 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1158060

Contact Information

Scott Dyreng
Duke University ( email )
Box 90120, Fuqua School of Business
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
Michelle Hanlon
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
77 Massachusetts Ave.
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-9849 (Phone)
Edward L. Maydew (Contact Author)
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ( email )
McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States
919-843-9356 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/faculty/directory/accounting/edward-maydew

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 6,660
Downloads: 1,541
Download Rank: 5,610
References:  48
Citations:  65
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.297 seconds