A General Analysis of Sequential Merger Games with an Application to Cross-Border Mergers
affiliation not provided to SSRN
LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EI36
This paper seeks to uncover why the pattern of equilibria in sequential merger games of a certain type is similar across a fairly wide class of models much studied in the literature. By developing general conditions characterising each element of the set of possible equilibria, I show that the solution to models that satisfy a certain sufficient condition will be restricted to the same subset of equilibria. This result is of empirical relevance in that the pattern of equilibria obtained for this wide class of models is associated with mergers not happening in isolation but rather bunching together. I extend the results to the analysis of cross-border mergers, studying two standard models that satisfy the sufficient condition --Sutton's (1991) vertically-differentiated oligopoly and Perry and Porter's (1985) fixed-supply-of-capital model.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52
JEL Classification: L10, L60working papers series
Date posted: July 11, 2008
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