Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158748
 
 

References (13)



 
 

Citations (26)



 


 



Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs


Joseph E. Harrington Jr.


Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics


The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 215-246, June 2008

Abstract:     
This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: July 14, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Harrington, Joseph E., Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs. The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 215-246, June 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158748 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00339.x

Contact Information

Joseph E. Harrington Jr. (Contact Author)
Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics ( email )
3400 Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218-2685
United States
410-516-7615 (Phone)
410-516-7600 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  13
Citations:  26

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