Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158749
 
 

References (16)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Strategic Vertical Integration without Foreclosure


E. Avenel


affiliation not provided to SSRN


The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 247-262, June 2008

Abstract:     
We determine the endogenous degree of vertical integration in a model of successive oligopoly that captures both efficiency gains and strategic effects. Foreclosure effects are purposely left aside. The profitability of integration originates in the greater ability of integrated firms to adopt a specific type of technologies. We show that vertical merger waves can stop by themselves before integration is complete because of strategic substitutability in vertical integration. This is in contrast to the strategic complementarity result in McLaren [2000] that leads to either complete integration or complete separation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: July 14, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Avenel, E., Strategic Vertical Integration without Foreclosure. The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 247-262, June 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158749 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00340.x

Contact Information

E. AVENEL (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN
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References:  16
Citations:  2

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