Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159631
 
 

Citations



 


 



One Share - One Vote: The Theory


Mike Burkart


Swedish House of Finance

Samuel Lee


New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

2008

Review of Finance, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 1-49, 2008

Abstract:     
The theoretical literature on security-voting structure can be organized around three questions: What impact do nonvoting shares have on takeover outcomes? How does disproportional voting power affect the incentives of blockholders? What are the repercussions of mandating one share - one vote for firms' financing and ownership choices? Overall, the costs and benefits of separating cash flow and votes reflect the fundamental governance trade off between disempowering blockholders and empowering managers. It is therefore an open question whether mandating one share - one vote would improve the quality of corporate governance, notably in systems that so far relied on active owners.

Keywords: G32

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: July 14, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Burkart, Mike and Lee, Samuel, One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2008). Review of Finance, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 1-49, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159631 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfm035

Contact Information

Mike C. Burkart (Contact Author)
Swedish House of Finance ( email )
Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Samuel Lee
New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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