Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160276
 
 

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Why Do Firms Appoint CEOs as Outside Directors?


Rüdiger Fahlenbrach


Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute

Angie Low


Nanyang Technological University - Division of Banking & Finance

Rene M. Stulz


Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

July 2008

Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2008-03-009
Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics Working Paper No. 2008-10

Abstract:     
We examine the determinants of appointments of outside CEOs to boards and how these appointments impact the appointing companies. We find that CEOs are most likely to join boards of large established firms that are geographically close, pursue similar financial and investment policies, and have comparable governance mechanisms to their own firms. It is also more likely that CEOs join firms with low insider ownership and firms with boards that already have other CEO directors. Except for the case of board interlocks, there is no evidence supporting the view that CEO directors have any impact on the appointing firm during their tenure, either positively or negatively. Appointments of CEO directors do not have a significant impact on the appointing firm's operating performance, its decision-making, the compensation of its CEO, or on the monitoring of management by the board. However, operating performance drops significantly for CEO director appointments when the CEO of the appointing firm already sits on the board of the appointee's firm.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: Director independence, new director appointment, director influence, quiet life

JEL Classification: G30, G34

working papers series





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Date posted: July 17, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger and Low, Angie and Stulz, Rene M., Why Do Firms Appoint CEOs as Outside Directors? (July 2008). Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2008-03-009; Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics Working Paper No. 2008-10. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160276 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1160276

Contact Information

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )
Quartier UNIL-Dorigny
Extranef 211
1015 Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland
++41-21-693-0098 (Phone)
++41-21-693-3010 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://sfi.epfl.ch/fahlenbrach.html
Swiss Finance Institute ( email )
c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland

Angie Low
Nanyang Technological University - Division of Banking & Finance ( email )
Singapore, 639798
Singapore
Rene M. Stulz (Contact Author)
Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )
2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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