Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160941
 
 

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How Does School Bureaucracy Affect Student Performance? A Case of New Jersey School Districts


Weerasak Krueathep


Chulalongkorn University - Faculty of Political Science; Center for Local Innovation and Governance; Rutgers University, Newark

June 7, 2008


Abstract:     
There exist extensive debates on the relationship between school bureaucracy and student performance. Chubb and Moe (1988, 1990) contend that bureaucracy causes poorer student performance. On the contrary, Smith and Meier (1994, 1995) argue that school bureaucracy is a result of poor performing schools, not vice versa. Therefore, this essay reexamines this relationship through new evidence using panel data from over 600 school districts in New Jersey during the years 2001 - 2002 and 2005 - 2006. Findings from fixed-effect models support both Chubb and Moe's (1988, 1990) and Smith and Meier's (1994, 1995) views. At the 8th and 11th grade levels, school bureaucracy is associated with poorer student performance as measured by literacy and mathematic tests. On the other hand, at the 4th grade level, there is a lack of evidence to conclude that school bureaucracy is harmful to students' learning. This research suggests that we have to be very specific when articulating school administration reforms. An across-the-board solution of eliminating all school bureaucratic institutions and replacing them with market-like school operations may not bring about positive outcomes as some advocates have argued.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: School bureaucracy, school choice, educational administrative reform

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Date posted: July 17, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Krueathep, Weerasak, How Does School Bureaucracy Affect Student Performance? A Case of New Jersey School Districts (June 7, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160941 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1160941

Contact Information

Weerasak Krueathep (Contact Author)
Chulalongkorn University - Faculty of Political Science ( email ) ( email )
Henre-Dunant Road
Patumwan, Bangkok 10330
Thailand
Center for Local Innovation and Governance ( email ) ( email )
Henre-Dunant Road
Patumwan, Bangkok 10330
Thailand
Rutgers University, Newark ( email )
360 MLK Blvd, Hill Hall 701
Newark, NJ 07102
United States
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