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Foundations of Incomplete Contracts


Oliver Hart


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

John Moore


University of Edinburgh - Economics; London School of Economics

September 1998

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE358

Abstract:     
In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of 'incomplete contracting'. However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1998a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

JEL Classification: D20, D80, H11, H70, L22, P11

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Date posted: July 16, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Hart , Oliver D. and Moore, John Hardman, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (September 1998). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE358. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160961

Contact Information

Oliver D. Hart (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-3461 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
John Hardman Moore
University of Edinburgh - Economics ( email )
50 George Square
Edinburgh, EH8 9JY, Scotland
United Kingdom
London School of Economics ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
44-171-955-7550 (Phone)
44-171-831-1840 (Fax)
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