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Implementation and Renegotiation
Eric Maskin Princeton University - Department of Economics; Harvard University - Department of Economics; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics John Moore University of Edinburgh - Economics; London School of Economics December 1998 LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE366 Abstract: The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.
JEL Classifications: D20, D80, H11, H70, L22, P11 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: July 16, 2008 ; Last revised: July 28, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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