Collusion in a One-Period Insurance Market with Adverse Selection
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Escuela de Gobierno - Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez
September 1, 2009
We show how collusive outcomes may occur in equilibrium in a one-period competitive insurance market characterized by adverse selection. We build on the Inderst and Wambach (2001) model and assume that insurees must pay a minimum premium, which is a common feature in many health systems. In this setup we show that there is a range of equilibria, from the zero profit one in which low-risks implicitly subsidize high risks, to one where firms obtain profits with both types of consumers. Moreover, we show that rents only partially dissipate if we assume free entry.
Along these equilibria, high risks always obtain full insurance while the low risks coverage decreases as the firms' profits increase.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24
Keywords: adverse selection, collusion, insurance, capacity constraints
JEL Classification: I11, I18, L41
Date posted: July 25, 2008 ; Last revised: September 21, 2009
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