Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1175964
 


 



COMMENTARY on R. Penny Marquette and Jesse F. Marquette


Ehsan H. Feroz


University of Washington, Tacoma-Milgard School of Business; Vernon Zimmerman Center, University of Illinois; US Government Accountability Office

July 25, 2008

RESEARCH IN GOVERNMENTAL AND NONPROFIT ACCOUNTING, James L. Chan, ed., Vol. 8, pp. 95-102, 1994

Abstract:     
Regulatory studies in economics and political science have debated the efficiency and wealth re-distributive potentials of regulations. While Stigler and the Chicago School of economics have focused on the market (informational) efficiency implications of a regulation, political scientists traditionally highlight the wealth re-distributive potentials of a regulation. Unbeknown to many political economists, accounting studies have made significant contributions in terms of documenting the wealth re-distributive potentials of financial accounting standards (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Feroz 1987; Ball and Smith 1992; Feroz and Hagerman 1990; and Brown and Feroz 1992). While the focus of these studies have been limited to the immediate claimants to the resources of an entity (managers, shareholders, and bondholders), their potentials for being applied to wider stakeholders such as the citizens and taxpayers is unlimited. Political economists can benefit from these models in their attempts to demonstrate the wealth re-distributive potentials of other regulations.

Apart from the issue of allocative efficiency of a regulation which is frequently a black box, there is also the issue of production efficiency implications of a regulation which has not been addressed adequately either in mainstream economics or elsewhere in social science. Accounting (particularly, managerial) data can provide a fertile basis for measuring the production efficiency implications of a regulation (e.g, Feroz, Raab, and Haag 2001; Raab and Feroz 2007; and Feroz, Raab, Ulleberg and Alsharif 2008). Interestingly, this provides another effective way of testing the theories of regulation - a favorite pastime for generations of political economists.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: Regulation, Accounting, Political Economy, Production Efficiency

JEL Classification: L3, L51, M4, P16

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Date posted: July 27, 2008 ; Last revised: August 25, 2014

Suggested Citation

Feroz, Ehsan H., COMMENTARY on R. Penny Marquette and Jesse F. Marquette (July 25, 2008). RESEARCH IN GOVERNMENTAL AND NONPROFIT ACCOUNTING, James L. Chan, ed., Vol. 8, pp. 95-102, 1994. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1175964

Contact Information

Ehsan H. Feroz (Contact Author)
University of Washington, Tacoma-Milgard School of Business ( email )
1900 Commerce Street, Campus Box 358420
Tacoma, WA 98402-3100
United States
(253) 692 4728 (Phone)
253 692 4523 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.tacoma.washington.edu/business
Vernon Zimmerman Center, University of Illinois ( email )
515 East Gregory Drive# 2307
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
US Government Accountability Office ( email )
441 G Street NW
Washington, DC 20548-0001
United States
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