Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1195202
 
 

References (27)



 
 

Citations (8)



 


 



Educational Networks, Mutual Fund Voting Patterns, and CEO Compensation


Alexander W. Butler


Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business

Umit G. Gurun


University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Jan 15, 2012


Abstract:     
Mutual funds whose managers are in the same educational network as the firm’s CEO are more likely to vote against shareholder-initiated proposals to limit executive compensation than out-of-network funds. This voting propensity is stronger when voting among the funds in a family is not unanimous. Furthermore, CEOs of firms with relatively high levels of educationally connected mutual fund ownership have higher levels of compensation than their unconnected counterparts. This aspect of executive compensation is related to both the abnormal trading performance of the connected investors in the firm and the perceived quality of firm management by the connected investors.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: executive compensation, social connections, share voting

JEL Classification: G34

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 3, 2008 ; Last revised: January 17, 2012

Suggested Citation

Butler, Alexander W. and Gurun, Umit G., Educational Networks, Mutual Fund Voting Patterns, and CEO Compensation (Jan 15, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1195202 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1195202

Contact Information

Alexander W. Butler (Contact Author)
Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business ( email )
MS 531
Houston, TX 77005
United States
713-348-6341 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~awbutler/
Umit G. Gurun
University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,409
Downloads: 279
Download Rank: 61,205
References:  27
Citations:  8

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.235 seconds