Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1201387
 
 

References (43)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination


Mathew D. McCubbins


Duke University School of Law

Ramamohan Paturi


University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Nicholas Weller


University of Southern California - Department of Political Science; University of Southern California - School of International Relations

August 4, 2008


Abstract:     
Networks can affect a group's ability to solve a coordination problem. We utilize laboratory experiments to study the conditions under which groups of subjects can solve coordination games. We investigate a variety of different network structures, and we also investigate coordination games with symmetric and asymmetric payoffs. Our results show that network connections facilitate coordination in both symmetric and asymmetric games. Most significantly, we find that increases in the number of network connections encourage coordination even when payoffs are highly asymmetric. These results shed light on the conditions that may facilitate coordination in real-world networks.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: networks, coordinatinon, experiments, human behavior


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Date posted: August 5, 2008 ; Last revised: March 1, 2009

Suggested Citation

McCubbins, Mathew D. and Paturi, Ramamohan and Weller, Nicholas, Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination (August 4, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1201387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1201387

Contact Information

Mathew D. McCubbins
Duke University School of Law ( email )
210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
Ramamohan Paturi
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0502
United States
Nicholas Weller (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Department of Political Science ( email )
Von KleinSmid Center, 327
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
University of Southern California - School of International Relations
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
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