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The Glorious Commander-in-Chief


Adrian Vermeule


Harvard Law School

August 6, 2008

Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 08-18
Harvard Law School Program on Risk Regulation Research Paper No. 08-4

Abstract:     
I examine the executive's power as Commander-in-Chief (or "CINC") of the armed forces, and the resulting problems for constitutional design and interpretation. Drawing upon Machiavelli's analysis, I attempt to state an economy of glory: an account of the benefits and costs of executive glory-seeking, and an account of how glory-seeking motivations on the part of the CINC can best be harnessed to the public interest. I then ask how the American national constitution should be interpreted in light of the economy of glory. I conclude that the optimal constitutional regime is one in which the executive is constrained in initiating conflicts, but not constrained in carrying them out.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: president, war powers, national security

working papers series


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Date posted: August 7, 2008 ; Last revised: November 17, 2008

Suggested Citation

Vermeule, Adrian, The Glorious Commander-in-Chief (August 6, 2008). Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 08-18; Harvard Law School Program on Risk Regulation Research Paper No. 08-4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1207942 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1207942

Contact Information

Adrian Vermeule (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1525 Massachusetts
Griswold 500
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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