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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1211177
 
 

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Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why?


Thomas J. Miles


University of Chicago - Law School

Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

August 7, 2008

U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 420
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 225

Abstract:     
Treaties are the primary source of international law. But little is known about which countries enter into treaties, which forms the treaties take, and which subjects they address. We present an exploratory analysis of a unique dataset of roughly 50,000 treaties ratified since 1946. We hypothesize that states enter treaties in order to obtain public goods but that the transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing treaties also limit the value of treaties. Simple predictions are that larger and richer states should benefit more from cooperation: therefore, they should be parties to more treaties. Older, less corrupt, and (again) larger states should face lower transaction costs and should belong to more treaties. Consistent with this prediction, these states enter into more bilateral treaties and "closed" multilateral treaties, but universal multilateral treaties where the benefits of cooperation are more attenuated and the costs of negotiation are low for small states.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

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Date posted: August 8, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Miles, Thomas J. and Posner, Eric A., Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why? (August 7, 2008). U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 420; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 225. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1211177 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1211177

Contact Information

Thomas J. Miles
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
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