The MC-Value for Monotonic NTU-Games
Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research
Hebrew University - Center for the Study of Rationality
Stef H. Tijs
Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica
International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 27, 1998
The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is shown that on the class of bargaining games the MC-value coincides with the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Furthermore, two characteristics of the MC-value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games which ned not be convex valued. This allows for a comparison between the MC-value and the egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985).
JEL Classification: C78Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 2, 1998
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