Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1219102
 
 

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Costs and Benefits of 'Friendly' Boards during Mergers and Acquisitions


Breno Schmidt


Emory University - Goizueta Business School

February 1, 2014

EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
Finance theory predicts that board independence is not always in the shareholders’ interest. In situations where board advice is more important than monitoring, independence can decrease firm value. I test this prediction by examining the connection between takeover returns and board “friendliness”, using social ties between the CEO and board members as a proxy for less independent boards. I find that social ties are associated with higher bidder announcement returns when the potential value of board advice is high, but with lower returns when monitoring needs are high. The evidence suggests that friendly boards can have both costs and benefits, depending on the company’s specific needs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: Governance, Social Networks, Mergers and Acquisitions

JEL Classification: G30, G34, G39

working papers series


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Date posted: March 13, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Schmidt, Breno, Costs and Benefits of 'Friendly' Boards during Mergers and Acquisitions (February 1, 2014). EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1219102 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1219102

Contact Information

Breno Schmidt (Contact Author)
Emory University - Goizueta Business School ( email )
1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322-2722
United States
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