Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=121948
 
 

References (24)



 
 

Citations (2)



 
 

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Dynamics and Limited Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements


Larry S. Karp


University of California, Berkeley

Sandeep Sacheti


University of California, Berkeley; American Express


Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 4.98

Abstract:     
The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be modified for certain types of pollution problems. For local pollution problems, a sufficient level of free-riding actually promotes signatories' welfare. For global pollution poblems, the conventional wisdom is correct insofar as free-riding makes it more difficult to form a successful IEA. However, for some global pollution problems, free-riding may disappear. A static model may overstate or understate the difficulty of forming a successful IEA. The effect of an IEA is sensitive to differences between the duration of the IEA and agents' planning horizon.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

JEL Classification: F12, F42, Q28

working papers series


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Date posted: September 17, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Karp, Larry S. and Sacheti, Sandeep, Dynamics and Limited Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 4.98. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=121948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.121948

Contact Information

Larry S. Karp (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley ( email )
Dept. of Agriculture & Resource Economics
313 Giannini Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-643-8911 (Fax)
Sandeep Sacheti
University of California, Berkeley
310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
American Express
Phoenix, AZ 85021
United States
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References:  24
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