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Dynamics and Limited Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements
Larry S. Karp
University of California, Berkeley
Sandeep Sacheti
University of California, Berkeley; American Express
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 4.98
Abstract:
The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be modified for certain types of pollution problems. For local pollution problems, a sufficient level of free-riding actually promotes signatories' welfare. For global pollution poblems, the conventional wisdom is correct insofar as free-riding makes it more difficult to form a successful IEA. However, for some global pollution problems, free-riding may disappear. A static model may overstate or understate the difficulty of forming a successful IEA. The effect of an IEA is sensitive to differences between the duration of the IEA and agents' planning horizon.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
JEL Classification: F12, F42, Q28
working papers series
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Date posted: September 17, 1998
Suggested CitationKarp, Larry S. and Sacheti, Sandeep, Dynamics and Limited Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 4.98. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=121948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.121948
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