Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1219784
 
 

References (62)



 
 

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Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy


Richard Schmalensee


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

April 30, 2009


Abstract:     
Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-setting organizations (SSOs). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSOs should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: antitrust, standards, innovation, patent, industrial organization

JEL Classification: K21, L40, O38

working papers series


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Date posted: August 12, 2008 ; Last revised: December 28, 2013

Suggested Citation

Schmalensee, Richard, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy (April 30, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1219784 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1219784

Contact Information

Richard Schmalensee (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Room E62-525
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-2957 (Phone)
617-258-6617 (Fax)
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References:  62
Citations:  4

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