Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1222733
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (2)



 


 



Designing Cartels Through Censorship


Dick M. Carpenter II


Institute for Justice

John K. Ross


Institute for Justice


Regulation, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 14-18, Summer 2008

Abstract:     
Business interests sometimes use titling laws - laws establishing who can use professional titles - as a form of occupational regulation to restrict entry. Such laws allow practitioners to provide services without a license, but deny them the ability to communicate openly to the public about those services. Because legislators typically see titling laws as less restrictive than licensure, industry leaders pursue them as an initial and more acceptable form of regulation. Once the laws are in place, insiders then seek to transform them into full licensure, which provides an even stronger barrier to entry.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: Licensing, regulation, title acts, titling laws, interior design, first amendment, free speech, entrepreneurial rights, licensure, cartels

JEL Classification: D4, D42, D45, H00, H1, J2, J23, J28, J4, J44, K2, K23, L8, L84

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 19, 2008 ; Last revised: August 21, 2008

Suggested Citation

Carpenter, Dick M. and Ross, John K., Designing Cartels Through Censorship. Regulation, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 14-18, Summer 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1222733

Contact Information

Dick M. Carpenter II (Contact Author)
Institute for Justice ( email )
901 N. Glebe Road
Arlington, VA 22203
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.ij.org
John K. Ross
Institute for Justice ( email )
901 N. Glebe Road
Arlington, VA 22203
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 350
Downloads: 27
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.265 seconds