Consent and its Counterfeits

Abstract:     
Consent theories of political obligation have a long but troubled history. They draw upon the unique powers that consent exhibits in everyday moral dealings, but they are frustrated by what can be called the "problem of massive nonconsent." The problem has been addressed by expansions of what is counted as consent, but the expansions have been challenged as untrue to the core concept of giving willing consent. Recently, David Estlund has proposed a novel conception of consent, which he terms "normative consent," which is intended to address the problem of massive nonconsent while being true to "the idiom of consent." This paper details the unique and enviable moral virtues consent possesses, and attempts to show that consent theories cannot hold on to enough of them to succeed in resolving the problem of political obligation.

Keywords: political obligation, duty to obey, authority, legitimacy, Locke, Kant, Estlund

JEL Classifications: K00

Working Paper Series