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Corporate Leverage and Currency Crises


Arturo Bris


IMD International; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Yale University - International Center for Finance

Yrjo Koskinen


Boston University - School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

June 2002

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 63, No. 2, 2002

Abstract:     
This paper provides an explanation of currency crises based on an argument that bailing out financially distressed exporting firms through a currency depreciation is ex-post optimal. Exporting firms have profitable investment opportunities, but they will not invest because high leverage causes debt overhang problems. The government can make investments feasible by not defending an exchange rate and letting the currency depreciate. Currency depreciation always increases the profitability of new investments when revenues from that project are in foreign currency and costs denominated in the domestic currency are nominally rigid. Although currency depreciation is always ex-post optimal once risky projects have been taken and failed, it can be harmful ex-ante, because it leads to excessive investment in risky projects even if more valuable safe projects are available. However, currency depreciation is also ex-ante optimal if risky projects have a higher expected return than safe projects and if firms are forced to rely on debt financing because of underdeveloped equity markets.

Keywords: currency depreciation, debt overhang, emerging markets, efficient investment policy, excessive risk taking

JEL Classification: F34, G15, G31, G32

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: August 17, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Bris, Arturo and Koskinen, Yrjo, Corporate Leverage and Currency Crises (June 2002). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 63, No. 2, 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1227166

Contact Information

Arturo Bris
IMD International ( email )
Ch. de Bellerive 23
P.O. Box 915
CH-1001 Lausanne
Switzerland
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Yale University - International Center for Finance ( email )
Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520
United States
Yrjo Koskinen (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Management ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-9775 (Phone)
617-353-6667 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://smgnet.bu.edu/mgmt_new/profiles/KoskinenYrjo.html
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom
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