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More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads


Michael D. Makowsky


Johns Hopkins University - Department of Emergency Medicine, Center for Advanced Modeling in the Social, Behavioral, and Health Sciences

Thomas Stratmann


George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

August 29, 2010


Abstract:     
Traffic accidents are one of the leading causes of injury and death in the U.S. The role of traffic law enforcement in the reduction of accidents has been studied by relatively few papers and with mixed results that may be due to a simultaneity problem. Traffic law enforcement may reduce accidents, but police are also likely to be stricter in accident-prone areas. We use municipal budgetary shortfalls as an instrumental variable to identify the effect of traffic citations on traffic safety and show that budgetary shortfalls lead to more frequent issuance of tickets to drivers. Using a panel of municipalities in Massachusetts, we show that increases in the number of tickets written reduce motor vehicle accidents and accident related injuries. The findings show that failure to control for endogeneity results in a significant underestimation of the positive impact of law enforcement on traffic safety.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: traffic accidents, safety, law enforcement, simultaneity

JEL Classification: K32. K42, H71, C33

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Date posted: August 19, 2008 ; Last revised: October 30, 2010

Suggested Citation

Makowsky, Michael D. and Stratmann, Thomas, More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads (August 29, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1232373 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1232373

Contact Information

Michael D. Makowsky (Contact Author)
Johns Hopkins University - Department of Emergency Medicine, Center for Advanced Modeling in the Social, Behavioral, and Health Sciences ( email )
Davis Building, Suite 3220
5801 Smith Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21209
United States
Thomas Stratmann
George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-2330 (Phone)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
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