Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1233503
 
 

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Waiting to Merge


Eileen Fumagalli


Konkurransetilsynet

Tore Nilssen


University of Oslo - Department of Economics

August, 18 2008


Abstract:     
We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there is an antitrust authority present to approve mergers, and there is a sufficient alignment of interests between the antitrust authority and the firms. We point out three distinct motives for not merging: the external-effect motive, the bargaining-power motive, and the pill-sweetening motive.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Mergers, Antitrust policy

JEL Classification: L11, L13, L41, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: August 18, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Fumagalli, Eileen and Nilssen, Tore, Waiting to Merge (August, 18 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1233503 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1233503

Contact Information

Eileen Fumagalli
Konkurransetilsynet ( email )
P.O. Box 439 Sentrum
NO- 5805 Bergen
Norway
+47 55 59 75 33 (Phone)
Tore Nilssen (Contact Author)
University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
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