Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1235942
 
 

References (26)



 
 

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Hidden Symmetries and Focal Points


Carlos Alós-Ferrer


University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Christoph Kuzmics


Bielefeld University

March 3, 2012


Abstract:     
We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: symmetry, focal points, frames, Nash equilibria

JEL Classification: C72, D83

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Date posted: August 20, 2008 ; Last revised: April 3, 2012

Suggested Citation

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Kuzmics, Christoph, Hidden Symmetries and Focal Points (March 3, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1235942 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1235942

Contact Information

Carlos Alos-Ferrer
University of Cologne - Department of Economics ( email )
Cologne, 50923
Germany
Christoph Kuzmics (Contact Author)
Bielefeld University ( email )
Postfach 100131
Bielefeld, 33501
Germany
+49 521 1064905 (Phone)
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