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Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting?

Ariel Ezrachi

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

David Gilo

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law

August 19, 2008

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2008

Excessive pricing by a dominant firm is considered as one of the most blatant forms of abuse. Despite this, in many instances, competition authorities refrain from intervening against excessive prices. The non-interventionist approach is based, among others, on the premise that high prices encourage new entry and thereby should be feared less. According to this view, in many cases, excessive prices are likely to be competed away and make intervention redundant. The following paper questions this conventional view and reconsiders whether excessive prices are indeed self-correcting. It illustrates how in the majority of cases excessive prices will not attract new entry of viable competitors, whether entry barriers are high or low. Furthermore, it shows how at times the prohibition of excessive prices may encourage, rather than discourage, entry. By doing so the paper narrows and focuses the arguments against intervention. Accordingly, it concludes that if excessive pricing is not to be prohibited it should not be due to it being 'self-correcting' but rather for reasons such as the need to stimulate investment or difficulties of implementation, which should be assessed on a case by case basis.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: antitrust, competition law, abuse of dominance, monopoly, excessive price, predatory pricing

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Date posted: August 21, 2008 ; Last revised: February 13, 2009

Suggested Citation

Ezrachi, Ariel and Gilo, David, Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting? (August 19, 2008). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1237802

Contact Information

Ariel Ezrachi
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
United Kingdom
David Gilo (Contact Author)
Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )
Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 69978, IL
+972-3-6406299 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN

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