Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1239369
 
 

References (13)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Market Entry Regulation and International Competition


Frank Stähler


University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Thorsten Upmann


University of Duisburg-Essen - Mercator School of Management; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)


Review of International Economics, Vol. 16, Issue 4, pp. 611-626, September 2008

Abstract:     
We analyze a non-cooperative two-country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto-efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is significant, production will be located in the cost-efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even substantial, the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is insignificant, production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: August 20, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Stähler, Frank and Upmann, Thorsten, Market Entry Regulation and International Competition. Review of International Economics, Vol. 16, Issue 4, pp. 611-626, September 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1239369 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00767.x

Contact Information

Frank Stähler (Contact Author)
University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics ( email )
Mohlstrasse 36
D-72074 Tuebingen, 72074
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.frank-staehler.de
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )
Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia
Thorsten Upmann
University of Duisburg-Essen - Mercator School of Management ( email )
Lotharstraße 65
Duisburg, D-47057
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
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